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Abstract
Adapting behavior to changes in the environment is a crucial ability for survival but such adaptation varies widely across in-
dividuals. Here, we asked how humans alter their economic decision-making in response to emotional cues, and whether
this is related to trait anxiety. Developing an emotional decision-making task for functional magnetic resonance imaging,
in which gambling decisions were preceded by emotional and non-emotional primes, we assessed emotional influences on
loss aversion, the tendency to overweigh potential monetary losses relative to gains. Our behavioral results revealed that
only low-anxious individuals exhibited increased loss aversion under emotional conditions. This emotional modulation of
decision-making was accompanied by a corresponding emotion-elicited increase in amygdala-striatal functional connectiv-
ity, which correlated with the behavioral effect across participants. Consistent with prior reports of ‘neural loss aversion’,
both amygdala and ventral striatum tracked losses more strongly than gains, and amygdala loss aversion signals were
exaggerated by emotion, suggesting a potential role for this structure in integrating value and emotion cues. Increased loss
aversion and striatal-amygdala coupling induced by emotional cues may reflect the engagement of adaptive harm-
avoidance mechanisms in low-anxious individuals, possibly promoting resilience to psychopathology.
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Introduction
Detecting and processing changes in our environment and
adapting our decisions in response to those changes, are im-
portant features of human behavior. For example, we are likely
to behave and make choices differently if we receive positive or
negative social feedback (Sip et al., 2015), or if threatening and
emotionally arousing cues appear in our surroundings (Mobbs
et al., 2007, 2009). However, such behavioral adaptation varies
substantially across individuals, and the factors that influence
how people alter their decision-making in emotional situations
remain poorly understood.
Trait anxiety is likely to be an important factor in people’s
tendency to alter their decisions in response to emotional cues.
Rodent studies have reported that low levels of anxiety are
associated with adaptive stress-coping and learning behavior
(Landgraf and Wigger, 2002; Herrero et al., 2006). Highly anxious
humans exhibit difficulty in modulating learning in volatile en-
vironments (Browning et al., 2015), cognitive control (Derryberry
and Reed, 2002; Bishop, 2007, 2009) and emotion regulation
(Etkin et al., 2010; Farmer and Kashdan, 2012); and it has been
suggested that the flexible modulation of behavior in response
to anxiogenic environmental changes may be an important
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mechanism by which further exposure to stress can be avoided
(Mathews and Mackintosh, 1998; Robinson et al., 2013, 2015).
Therefore it is possible that highly anxious individuals may fail
to adapt their decision-making under emotional conditions. On
the other hand, high anxiety is also associated with exaggerated
responses to emotional stimuli (Etkin et al., 2004; Fox et al., 2007;
Stein et al., 2007; Sehlmeyer et al., 2011), raising the possibility
that decision-making in highly anxious individuals may be dis-
proportionately influenced by emotion.
Therefore, we asked whether decision making is influenced by
emotional cues to a greater extent in low-anxious individuals (po-
tentially driven by greater behavioral flexibility) or in high-anxious
individuals (potentially driven by greater emotional reactivity). To
disambiguate between these hypotheses, we developed a func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) paradigm where each
decision (accepting or rejecting a gamble) was preceded by emo-
tional or non-emotional primes. We examined people’s decisions
in the framework of Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979) and modeled their loss aversion [the tendency to overweigh
potential losses relative to gains (Kahneman et al., 1991; Hardie
et al., 1993)] under emotional relative to non-emotional conditions.
To investigate whether avoidance of potential losses is altered spe-
cifically under threat, or under emotional arousal in general, we
used both negative and positive emotional cues.
Based on prior work implicating the amygdala and ventral
striatum in both loss aversion (Tom et al., 2007; De Martino et al.,
2010; Canessa et al., 2013; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013) and the pro-
cessing of emotional cues (Adolphs, 2002; Glascher and
Adolphs, 2003; Dalgleish, 2004; Mobbs et al., 2006; Phelps, 2006;
Pessoa and Adolphs, 2010; Wang et al., 2014), we hypothesized
that these regions would drive the influence of emotion on eco-
nomic decisions. Specifically, we tested two mechanistic
hypotheses: (i) that enhanced amygdala and striatum responses
to potential losses relative to gains (‘neural loss aversion’) may
be directly modulated by emotion in a manner that drives
changes in behavior and (ii) that the amygdala and ventral stri-
atum play complementary roles in this modulation of decision-
making, and it is their functional integration (as opposed to
their activation) that underlies changes in loss aversion.
Materials and methods
Participants
Thirty healthy volunteers were recruited by advertisement. Data
from two participants were excluded because of a lack of behav-
ioral consistency in the gambling task, making loss aversion im-
possible to model. Final analyses included 28 participants (15
males, 13 females, age range 19–47 years, mean 26.5 years).
Participants gave written informed consent and were paid for
their participation in an incentive-compatible manner. See
Supplementary Methods for exclusion criteria and payment de-
tails. The study was approved by the local departmental ethics
committee.
Procedure
Participants attended the laboratory on 2 different days. On Day
1 (screening session), participants were administered the Mini
International Neuropsychiatric Interview (Sheehan et al., 1998),
Beck depression inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1961) and an MRI
safety questionnaire. Eligibility for the study required: no past
or present psychiatric disorders, including alcohol/substance
dependence/abuse, BDI< 15 and no MRI contraindications.
Participants were told that the aim of the study was to investi-
gate how memory was affected by emotions. This cover story
was used to avoid participants deducing the true goal of the ex-
periment (demand characteristics: Orne, 2009), i.e. the manipu-
lation of their gambling behavior by emotion. They first
practiced the memory task (see Supplementary Methods for a
full description). Then they were instructed that to make this
memory task more challenging, they would perform a distract-
ing gambling task while holding the stimuli in memory. They
next completed a training block of gamble-only trials. Finally,
they completed a training block of the combined emotional
decision-making task (Figure 1A).
Participants returned to the laboratory for Day 2 (scanning
session) after the screening session (mean delay¼ 17.92 days,
range¼ 1–44 days). During this session, they initially completed
one block of trials of the combined emotional decision-making
task (Figure 1A) before entering the scanner, and four further 11-
min blocks during fMRI scanning. Since there is large variability
in loss aversion across individuals, each participant’s indiffer-
ence point on the loss aversion task from Day 1 was used on Day
2 to individually tailor the gamble matrix (Figure 1B and C).
After the scan, participants completed the BDI a second time
and the state-trait anxiety inventory (Spielberger et al., 1983).
None of the 28 participants scored above 15 on the BDI at this
time (mean¼ 1.68, s.d.6 2.09, range 0–10). Mean trait anxiety
was 31.2 (s.d.66.34). Trait anxiety was used as a covariate in
the analyses; in addition, a median split was performed, with 14
participants in a ‘low’ trait anxiety group (mean¼ 25.9,
s.d.6 3.03, range 20–30) and 14 in a ‘high’ trait anxiety group
(mean¼ 36.5, s.d.63.65, range 33–44).
Emotional decision-making task
Each trial started with the presentation of either two or four
prime stimuli from the same condition (happy/fearful/neutral/
object) for 3 s (prime: Figure 1A). Participants were instructed to
memorize their location. After a jittered delay of 2–6 s, the gam-
ble appeared for 2 s and participants decided whether to accept
or reject this gamble. There was another 2–6 s jittered delay be-
fore the probe face/object appeared. Participants had 2 s to indi-
cate the location where the probe had been displayed in the
first screen, followed by a 1 s fixation cross between trials.
Gamble outcomes were not revealed. The two delays were jit-
tered to decorrelate the prime stimuli from the gamble presen-
tation time, but always summed to 8 s, such that the intertrial
interval was maintained at a constant 16 s throughout the task.
Participants completed 196 trials of this combined task (49 trials
of each of the four conditions: happy, fearful, neutral, object).
Gambles were randomly sampled from a 7*7 gain–loss matrix
centered on each participant’s own indifference point (example
matrices: Figure 1B and C). This was done to ensure that the
same ranges of wins and losses were presented for each emo-
tion condition, and to optimize sensitivity to detect emotion-
driven changes in loss aversion with a majority of gambles close
to the participant’s indifference point.
Behavioral data analysis
Behavioral data were analyzed using IBM SPSS Statistics (v.21)
and Matlab. Missed gamble trials were excluded. For each par-
ticipant, the probability of accepting the gamble (Paccept), mean
reaction time (RT) to accept or reject the gamble, number of
missed trials and working memory accuracy were calculated
separately for the different emotion conditions and submitted
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to repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) to assess
the impact of emotion on behavior. Trait anxiety scores were
added as covariates in the analyses (Supplementary Table S1).
To assess loss aversion a two-parameter model was estimated
based on Prospect Theory’s subjective utility function using a max-
imum likelihood estimation procedure in Matlab (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009; Chib et al., 2012). For each
trial, the subjective utility (u) of each gamble was estimated using
the following equation (with losses coded as negative values):
u gambleð Þ ¼ 0:5  gain þ 0:5  k  loss (1)
where k is the ‘loss aversion’ parameter: k> 1 indicates an over-
weighing of gains relative to losses and k< 1 the converse.
These subjective utility values were used in a softmax function
to estimate the probability of accepting each gamble (coded as 0
or 1 for each rejected or accepted gamble, respectively):
P gamble acceptanceð Þ ¼ ð1 þ expðl  u gambleð ÞÞÞ1 (2)
where m is the logit sensitivity or ‘inverse temperature’ param-
eter, an index of choice consistency for repeated identical gam-
bles, equivalent to the maximal slope of a logistic regression
curve: higher m values indicate more consistent choices.
Different models were run using this procedure, where loss
aversion (k) and choice consistency (m) parameters were esti-
mated: (i) across all trials; (ii) separately for emotional (happy
and fearful faces) and non-emotional (neutral faces and objects)
trials or (iii) separately for each of the four emotion conditions.
Model comparison analyses using Bayesian Information
Criteron (BIC) (Schwartz, 1978) revealed that the two-condition
model was more parsimonious than the four-condition model
(see Supplementary Methods for details). Therefore, the two-
condition model was used preferentially in all analyses, except
to verify that the effects obtained were independent of valence
or specific to emotion rather than faces in general. The percent-
age change in k and in l between emotional and non-emotional
conditions was calculated from this two-condition model. Both
variables were normally distributed with Skewness values
smaller than 1 and Kurtosis values smaller than 3 (percentage
change in k: Skewness¼0.252, Kurtosis¼ 0.669; percentage
change in m: Skewness¼ 0.672, Kurtosis¼ 2.033). However, the
distribution of the loss aversion parameter k was positively
skewed, so when analyses where run on this parameter per se
(e.g. correlation between loss aversion and trait anxiety), k val-
ues were log-transformed before running statistical tests.
To estimate risk aversion we used a procedure reported pre-
viously (De Martino et al., 2010), based on the behavioral
Fig. 1. Experimental design. (A) On each trial, participants were first presented with an array (prime) of 2 or 4 faces (all happy, all fearful or all neutral) or objects (light
bulbs) and had 3 s to memorize it. They then had to decide whether to accept or reject a mixed gamble in which there was a 50% chance of winning the amount in
green, and a 50% chance of losing the amount in red. Finally, a probe from the first array was presented and participants had to report its position. (B, C) To optimize
model fitting and sensitivity to emotional context, an estimate of each participant’s indifference point (IP) was obtained from the practice session and used to define
the gamble gain/loss matrix. Each matrix was formed by combining seven potential gains with seven potential losses, leading to 49 gambles, repeated across each of
the four conditions. Example matrices are shown with the resulting gamble expected value (EV¼0.5*gainþ0.5*loss), centered on an IP of 0 (B, non-loss averse partici-
pant) or 4.5 (C, highly loss averse participant).
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sensitivity to gamble variance (O’Neill and Schultz, 2010). When
gamble variance is high (e.g. win £10/lose £10 relative to win £2/
lose £2), the risk is high; therefore, risk averse individuals will
exhibit a stronger reduction in gamble acceptance as gamble
variance increases. To calculate this sensitivity to gamble vari-
ance, a linear regression was run between gamble variance [cal-
culated for each gamble as (0.5*gain 0.5*loss)2] and the
probability of gamble acceptance (calculated for groups of gam-
bles with the same variance). For each subject, risk aversion
was approximated by the negative value of this regression
slope, separately for emotional and non-emotional conditions.
Note that the design of the task did not allow us to concurrently
estimate loss and risk aversion in the same utility model. To do
so, the task should have included a subset of trials where risk is
present, but losses do not need to be weighed against gains, so
that the model can distinguish between risk and loss aversion.
However, because of fMRI time constraints, we were not able to
add these trials to the task. Risk aversion was therefore estimated
separately and added as a covariate in the analyses to ensure it
did not affect the results. In particular, to ensure that the influ-
ence of trait anxiety was specific to the change in loss aversion,
partial correlations were conducted, where emotion-driven
change in loss aversion was correlated with trait anxiety while
controlling for changes in risk aversion and choice consistency.
MRI data acquisition and analysis
Acquisition parameters. Neuroimaging data were collected on a
Siemens Avanto 1.5 T MRI scanner using a 32-channel head coil.
To correct for inhomogeneities of the static magnetic field,
fieldmaps were acquired and used in the unwarping stage of
data preprocessing. Four functional scanning sessions, com-
posed of 4 dummy and 203 functional volumes, were acquired
using a pre-scan normalized gradient echo-planar imaging se-
quence with the following parameters: volume repetition
time¼ 3.132 s, echo time¼ 50 ms, flip angle¼ 90, ma-
trix¼ 64 64, voxel size¼ 3 3 3 mm3, 36 axial slices sampled
for whole-brain coverage, tilt¼30. A T1-weighted magnetiza-
tion-prepared rapid gradient-echo (MP-RAGE) anatomical scan
was acquired at the end of the session (176 sagittal slices, repe-
tition time¼ 2.73 s, echo time¼ 3.57 ms, flip angle¼ 7, ma-
trix¼ 224 256, voxel size¼ 1 1 1 mm3).
Statistical analyses. MRI data preprocessing and analysis were
performed using Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM8) software
(Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK, http://
www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) in Matlab. Preprocessing included field
map correction, realignment, unwarping, coregistration, spatial
normalization and smoothing (see Supplementary Materials for
details). For each participant, the general linear model was used
to model blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signals during the
task, incorporating an autoregressive [AR(1)] model of serial cor-
relations and a high-pass filter at 1/128 s.
Two first-level models were defined. The first model identi-
fied brain regions tracking gain and loss value independent of
emotion (similar to Tom et al., 2007). It included the following
regressors (and associated durations), collapsed across all mem-
ory conditions and convolved with the SPM synthetic hemo-
dynamic response function: prime onset (3 s); gamble onset (2 s)
with gain value, loss value (coded as negative values) and choice
difficulty (distance between gamble expected value and partici-
pant’s indifference point) as parametric modulators; memory probe
onset (stick function); missed gamble onset (if any: stick function).
The six movement parameters were also included in the model.
To assess whether these responses were modulated by
emotion, another model contained the same regressors as
above but separately for emotional trials (happy and fearful
faces) and non-emotional trials (neutral faces and objects).
This constituted our primary analysis based on the behavioral
results suggesting that grouping trials into emotional and
non-emotional ones was most parsimonious. However, to en-
sure that our effects were not driven by face processing per se
and to contrast emotional with neutral faces, we estimated a
further model in which neutral face and object trials were
modeled separately.
First-level contrasts were created through linear combin-
ations of the resulting beta images and analyzed at the group
level with one-sample t-tests, using the standard summary-
statistics approach to random-effects analysis in SPM. A clus-
ter-forming threshold of P< 0.001 uncorrected was applied, fol-
lowed by family-wise error (FWE) correction at P< 0.05, using
small-volume correction (SVC) in our a priori regions of interest
(ROIs). These were bilateral ventral striatum (caudate and puta-
men, left and right combined) given its role in loss aversion
(Tom et al., 2007; Canessa et al., 2013) and bilateral amygdala,
given its role in processing emotion (Adolphs, 2002; Glascher
and Adolphs, 2003; Dalgleish, 2004; Phelps, 2006; Pessoa and
Adolphs, 2010; Wang et al., 2014). ROIs were anatomically
defined using the automated anatomical labeling atlas in the
SPM WfuPickAtlas toolbox (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002).
Functional connectivity analyses. Amygdala-striatum functional
connectivity was analyzed using psychophysiological inter-
action (PPI) in SPM8. First, the ventral striatum cluster found to
track value (using a P< 0.001 (uncorrected) threshold and
masked with the anatomical ROI) was used as the seed region.
BOLD time series was extracted across all voxels in this mask
and adjusted for all effects of interest. A first-level model was
created for each participant including the deconvolved striatal
BOLD timeseries (physiological regressor), the emotional con-
text (contrast between emotional and non-emotional trials at
the time of the gamble: psychological regressor) and their cross-
product (PPI regressor). This model also included the following
regressors: prime onset, memory probe onset, parametric
modulators for gains and losses at gamble onset, all split by
emotion condition, as well as missed gamble onset (if any) and
movement regressors. Two nuisance timeseries were also
added, from a white-matter voxel (corpus callosum body,
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates: 0,14,19) and
from a cerebrospinal fluid voxel (center of right lateral ventricle,
MNI coordinates: 4,14,18); both in the same y-plane as the ven-
tral striatum peak voxel. Finally, contrasts were defined on the
striatal timeseries (physiological) regressor, modeling ‘main ef-
fect’ functional connectivity and on the PPI regressor, modeling
the modulation of functional connectivity by emotional context,
which were analyzed at the second level. Again, to make sure
that our effects were driven by emotional faces rather than
faces in general, the PPI analysis was repeated for emotional vs
neutral faces trials at the time of the gamble (excluding the ob-
ject condition).
Results
Emotional modulation of loss aversion depends on trait
anxiety
Emotional stimuli increased loss aversion (k) in individuals with
low trait anxiety. The percentage change in loss aversion was
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calculated for each participant between emotional and non-
emotional trials, thus removing interindividual variability due
to loss aversion values per se, and related to trait anxiety scores
across participants. We identified a significant negative rela-
tionship between emotion-driven change in loss aversion and
trait anxiety (r(28)¼ 0.524, P¼ 0.004, Figure 2A), such that low-
anxious individuals showed the greatest increase in loss
aversion induced by emotional cues. Importantly, baseline loss
aversion (modeled across all trials independent of emotion con-
dition and log-transformed because positively skewed) was not
correlated with trait anxiety (r(28)¼0.031, P¼ 0.88; after remov-
ing one outlier with very high k: r(28)¼ 0.043, P¼ 0.83), suggesting
that the effect of trait anxiety on loss aversion change is not
simply driven by regression to the mean.
The percentage change in risk aversion between emotional
and non-emotional trials, although highly correlated with
change in loss aversion (r(28)¼ 0.65, P< 0.001; expected given
that loss and risk aversion were estimated separately; see De
Martino et al., 2010; Canessa et al., 2013), was not correlated with
trait anxiety (r(28)¼0.23, P¼ 0.24). Finally, the correlation be-
tween emotion-induced change in loss aversion and trait anx-
iety was unchanged when controlling for change in risk
aversion and change in choice consistency (partial correlation,
r(28)¼0.51, P¼ 0.008).
Performing a median split on trait anxiety scores confirmed
the emotional modulation of loss aversion, revealing a signifi-
cant condition (emotion/no emotion) * trait anxiety (low/high)
interaction (F(1,26)¼ 6.96, P¼ 0.014). Although the ‘low’ anxious
group showed a significant increase in loss aversion following
emotional relative to non-emotional stimuli (þ 5.49%,
s.d.¼ 6.38%, t(13)¼ 3.22, P¼ 0.007), there was no significant effect
of emotion on loss aversion in the ‘high’ trait anxiety group
(2.81%, s.d.¼ 7.52%, t(13)¼1.40, P¼ 0.18).
To check that collapsing emotional (happy/fearful) and non-
emotional (neutral/object) conditions together did not alter the
results, we examined the change in loss aversion separately for
each condition (happy, fearful and neutral) relative to object
(Figure 2B). First, there was no difference between positive and
negative emotion: the valence (happy/fearful) * trait anxiety
group (low/high) interaction was non-significant (F(1,26)¼ 0.24,
P¼ 0.63) and the effect of trait anxiety group on emotionally
driven changes in loss aversion was significant for happy and
fearful faces separately (happy: t(26)¼ 2.04, P¼ 0.05; fearful:
t(26)¼ 2.75, P¼ 0.01). Second, the effect of neutral faces relative to
object stimuli on loss aversion did not differ between trait anx-
iety groups (t(26)¼ 0.6, P¼ 0.55). Third, model comparison ana-
lyses (see Supplementary Methods) showed that estimating loss
aversion for emotional and non-emotional trials (i.e. collapsing
happy and fearful together, and neutral and object together)
was more parsimonious than estimating loss aversion separately
for all conditions.
Analyses of the choice consistency parameter (l) revealed
that participants were more consistent in their gambling
choices on emotional than non-emotional trials, though this ef-
fect did not correlate significantly with trait anxiety (see
Supplementary Results and Figure S1). Similarly, only the emo-
tional modulation of gamble acceptance and loss aversion cor-
related significantly with trait anxiety, ruling out the possibility
that differences in memory, RTs or missed trials may have
driven the observed effects (Supplementary Table S1).
Taken together, our behavioral results suggest that emo-
tional cues trigger changes in loss aversion as a function of trait
anxiety, such that low-anxious individuals show the greatest
emotionally-induced increase in loss aversion. In addition, we
reveal that this effect is not driven by risk aversion or by choice
consistency. Finally, and surprisingly, both positive and nega-
tive emotional stimuli have a similar effect.
Neural responses to decreasing losses are greater than
to increasing gains
The first step in our fMRI data analysis was to verify that expected
value signals were observed in the brain at the time of gamble,
with exaggerated responses to losses (‘neural loss aversion’) in the
ventral striatum. Next, we examined responses to emotional
primes as well as emotional modulation of value signals in the
amygdala. Finally, we investigated the interaction between these
two regions using functional connectivity. For all analyses, we
additionally assessed the relationship with trait anxiety.
A whole-brain analysis was first conducted to identify clus-
ters with a parametric response to decreasing losses and
increasing gains, time-locked to the presentation of the decision
and independent of emotion condition. This gain and loss con-
trast is equivalent to a single parametric modulator represent-
ing the expected value of the gamble (0.5*gainþ 0.5*loss, with
losses coded as negative values). Three clusters surviving
whole-brain correction for multiple comparisons were found to
track gamble value (Supplementary Table S2A), located in the
right ventral striatum (Figure 3A), right amygdala/hippocampus
(Figure 3B) and anterior cingulate/orbitofrontal cortex (ACC/
OFC) (Figure 3C), confirming previous reports of generic value
Fig. 2. Emotional cues modulate loss aversion in low-anxious individuals. (A)
The change in loss aversion following emotional relative to non-emotional
primes was negatively correlated with trait anxiety across participants. (B)
Participants with low trait anxiety (median-split, N¼ 14 per group) showed a sig-
nificant increase in loss aversion following both happy and fearful stimuli.
Collapsing fearful and happy trials into an emotional condition and neutral and
object trials into a non-emotional condition was justified by the fact that there
was no valence effect, and no differences between neutral faces relative to ob-
ject stimuli. Two-tailed P-values: *P<0.05. Error bars represent SEM.
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signals in these regions (Gottfried et al., 2003; Tom et al., 2007;
Kable and Glimcher, 2009; Morrison and Salzman, 2010).
Parameter estimates (betas) were extracted for each region,
separately for losses and gains. We identified a greater para-
metric response to decreasing losses relative to increasing gains
in each of these three regions (significant in the ventral stri-
atum, t(27)¼ 3.52, P¼ 0.002; and amygdala, t(27)¼ 3.16, P¼ 0.004;
marginally significant in the ACC/OFC, t(27)¼ 1.95, P¼ 0.06;
Figure 3D–F), consistent with previous reports of loss-biased
value signals in these regions (Tom et al., 2007; Canessa et al.,
2013; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013). We confirmed the result in the
ventral striatum by creating a loss minus gain contrast (similar to
Tom et al., 2007). This voxel-wise search yielded a cluster in the
ventral striatum that responded more strongly to decreasing
losses than increasing gains, overlapping with that reported
earlier. This response correlated with trait anxiety across individ-
uals, a result presented and discussed in Supplementary Results.
Amygdala response to emotional cues correlates
positively with trait anxiety
In a second analysis, time-locked to the presentation of the
prime, we contrasted emotion (happy and fearful faces) with
non-emotion (neutral faces and objects) trials. Consistent with
prior reports (Sabatinelli et al., 2011), this revealed a widespread
pattern of activation, with whole-brain corrected results in the fu-
siform gyrus, occipital gyrus, OFC/medial prefrontal cortex, pos-
terior cingulate cortex, middle temporal gyrus, anterior insula,
inferior temporal gyrus extending into frontal gyrus and
Fig. 3. Brain regions tracking gamble expected values. A whole-brain analysis was conducted to identify regions showing a parametric response to decreasing losses
and to increasing gains. Clusters surviving whole-brain FWE correction were found in the ventral striatum (A), the amygdala extending into the hippocampus (B) and
the ACC/OFC (C). Activations are displayed at P<0.001 (uncorrected) on the average anatomical scan from all 28 participants. Color bars represent T-values. (D–F)
Parameter estimates (betas) extracted from the parametric response to losses (red bars) and to gains (green bars) separately revealed greater tracking of losses relative
to gains in these regions (at trend level in the ACC). Note that the latter contrasts are orthogonal to that used for voxel identification and therefore do not require cor-
rection for a voxel-wise search. Two-tailed P-values: *P<0.05, †P<0.1. Error bars represent SEM.
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amygdala extending into bilateral hippocampus (Supplementary
Table S3). Given previous literature suggesting that amygdala re-
sponses vary with anxiety (Etkin et al., 2004; Stein et al., 2007;
Sehlmeyer et al., 2011), we extracted signal from the right amygdala
cluster (peak voxel MNI coordinates: 33,1,26; Figure 4A) and
identified a significant positive relationship with trait anxiety
(r(28)¼ 0.417, P¼ 0.027; Figure 4B). This relationship was not driven
by responses to faces in general: while amygdala responses to
emotional relative to neutral faces correlated with trait anxiety
(r(28)¼ 0.39, P¼ 0.04), amygdala responses to neutral faces relative
to objects did not (r(28)¼0.042, P¼ 0.83; marginally significant dif-
ference between the two correlations: Steiger’s Z¼ 1.83, P¼ 0.067).
Emotional cues modulate loss aversion signals in the
amygdala
To test whether the earlier amygdala responses play a role in
the observed emotion-driven changes in loss aversion, para-
metric responses to losses and to gains (at the time of the gam-
ble) were extracted separately for emotional and non-emotional
trials, from the right amygdala cluster identified earlier (re-
sponding to emotional primes—MNI: 33,1,26). The resulting
parameter estimates (betas) were submitted to a 2  (gamble
component: loss/gain) by 2 (prime: emotional/non-emotional)
repeated-measures ANOVA. There was a significant interaction
(F(1,27)¼ 7.998, P¼ 0.009, Figure 4C), driven by a positive amyg-
dala parametric modulation, on emotional trials only, by
decreasing losses (t(27)¼ 3.61, P¼ 0.001) but not increasing gains
(t(27)¼0.88, P¼ 0.39). However, there were no relationships
with trait anxiety or emotion-elicited change in loss aversion
(added as covariates: all P> 0.25).
The earlier modulation of amygdala value signal was spe-
cific to emotional cues, rather than faces in general. When ex-
tracting the response to losses separately for emotion, neutral
and object conditions, and submitting the resulting betas to a
one-way ANOVA (emotion/neutral/object), there was a signifi-
cant main effect of emotion (F(2,54)¼ 3.49, P¼ 0.038). The amyg-
dala parametric response to losses was higher on emotional
face relative to neutral face trials (t(27)¼ 3.08, P¼ 0.005) but not
on neutral face relative to object trials (t(27)¼0.6, P¼ 0.55).
Striatal-amygdala functional connectivity is associated
with changes in loss aversion
Are emotionally induced changes in loss aversion driven by
ventral striatum-amygdala interactions during emotional deci-
sion-making? To test this hypothesis, we conducted a PPI, with
emotion vs non-emotion (at the time of the decision) as the
Fig. 4. Modulation of amygdala responses by emotional cues. (A) A cluster in the right amygdala showed greater response to emotional vs non-emotional primes (i.e. at
initial stimulus presentation). Activation is displayed at P<0.001 (uncorrected), but survived FWE voxel-level SVC (PSVC<0.05) in the anatomically defined bilateral
amygdala ROI. The color bar represents T-values and voxels are overlaid on the average anatomical scan from all 28 participants. (B) Amygdala response to emotional
primes was positively correlated with trait anxiety. (C) Extracting parametric response to losses and to gains in this amygdala cluster at the time of gamble, separately
for emotion and no emotion trials, revealed that the amygdala only tracks decreasing losses following emotional cues. Two-tailed P-values: *P< 0.05. Error bars repre-
sent SEM.
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psychological factor (Figure 5A). The ventral striatum cluster
(shown in Figure 3A) was defined as the seed region, and beta
estimates for the physiological (see Supplementary Results) and
PPI effects were extracted from the right amygdala cluster that
responded to emotional cues (the target region: shown in Figure
4A). The increase in ventral striatum-amygdala connectivity be-
tween non-emotional and emotional trials was negatively cor-
related with trait anxiety (r(28)¼0.47, P¼ 0.012, Figure 5B), and
positively correlated with emotion-elicited change in loss
aversion (r(28)¼ 0.42, P¼ 0.025, Figure 5C). In other words, low-
anxious individuals exhibited an increase in striatal-amygdala
functional connectivity on emotional trials, which in turn was
associated with emotion-elicited loss aversion.
Again, this pattern of results held when examining the emo-
tion-driven change in striatal-amygdala connectivity, excluding
the object condition (negative correlation between PPI and trait
anxiety: r(28)¼0.38, P¼ 0.047), suggesting that trait anxiety
modulates functional connectivity changes specifically in re-
sponse to emotional stimuli.
Discussion
How people alter their decisions in response to emotional cues,
and the neural mechanisms underlying such changes, vary
with their level of trait anxiety. Specifically, we reveal that low-
anxious individuals exhibit increased loss aversion when
primed with emotional cues. This was accompanied by and
associated with increased functional coupling between the stri-
atum and amygdala, regions that have been implicated in loss
aversion (Tom et al., 2007; De Martino et al., 2010; Canessa et al.,
2013; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013).
One of our main aims was to establish whether loss aversion
would be modulated by emotional cues to a greater extent in
low-anxious individuals (which would be predicted by greater
behavioral flexibility) or in high-anxious individuals (which
would be predicted by emotional hypersensitivity). Our data
support the first hypothesis. This is consistent with a recent
study in which only low-anxious individuals decreased risk-
taking under stress (Robinson et al., 2015). We suggest that this
finding may reflect an adaptive ability of individuals with low
anxiety to deploy harm-avoidance strategies (avoiding potential
harm from monetary losses) in response to emotionally
arousing cues. This could be linked with the reduced sensitivity
to pathological anxiety disorders in this low-anxiety group
(Robinson et al., 2013, 2015) and with previous reports of anx-
iety-related impairments in the ability to adapt behavior to
changes in the environment (Blanchette and Richards, 2003;
Farmer and Kashdan, 2012; Robinson et al., 2013, 2015; Browning
et al., 2015).
An alternative interpretation of our findings could be that
high-anxious individuals may in fact exhibit greater attentional
control than low-anxious individuals and be better at ignoring
the emotional primes, which are irrelevant to the gambling
task. Although this interpretation is inconsistent with the the-
ory of impaired attentional control in anxiety (Eysenck et al.,
2007; Bishop, 2009), it remains possible that such superior atten-
tional control is a feature of non-clinical anxiety (i.e. high trait
anxiety in healthy individuals; see Robinson et al., 2013 for a re-
view), and that dysfunctional attentional control only emerges
in clinical anxiety. Further work is needed to distinguish be-
tween these explanations.
Recent literature has shown a growing interest in the link
between anxiety and decision-making (for a review see Hartley
and Phelps, 2012) and provided evidence for heightened sensi-
tivity to uncertainty and ambiguity in high anxiety. A
recent study demonstrated an increased framing effect in high-
anxious individuals (Xu et al., 2013). According to Prospect
Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), framing effects on
choice could be driven both by loss aversion and by diminishing
sensitivity to changes in value as value increases (resulting in
risk avoidance in the gain domain and risk seeking in the loss
domain). In our data, we did not find a direct relationship be-
tween trait anxiety and loss aversion, suggesting that the
increased framing effect observed in Xu et al. (2013) may be
driven by stronger diminishing sensitivity to value changes in
high trait anxious individuals, rather than by increased loss
aversion. Similarly, our data is in line with a recent study in
adolescents showing that clinically anxious and healthy adoles-
cents did not differ in their level of loss aversion (Ernst et al.,
2014). We note that our sample of healthy volunteers included a
relatively constrained range of anxiety scores; it would
Fig. 5. Emotional modulation of striatum-amygdala functional connectivity is
related to trait anxiety and loss aversion change. (A) PPI analysis was conducted
to assess how ventral striatum-amygdala functional connectivity was modu-
lated by emotional relative to non-emotional cues, using the ventral striatum
cluster as a seed (Figure 3A). (B) The PPI effect (i.e. emotion-driven increased
connectivity) in the amygdala was negatively correlated with trait anxiety. In
other words, low-anxious individuals exhibited increased ventral striatum-
amygdala connectivity following emotional relative to non-emotional stimuli.
(C) This increased functional connectivity was associated with emotion-elicited
increase in loss aversion across participants.
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therefore be interesting to examine loss aversion (and its modu-
lation by emotion) in clinically anxious individuals.
Our findings revealed that positive and negative emotional
expressions induced similar changes in decision-making. This
supports the hypothesis that increased avoidance of potential
losses is recruited under general emotional arousal, rather than
specifically under incidental threat. Recent work, using a
pharmacological manipulation of autonomic arousal, suggests
that arousal responses specifically drive loss aversion, but not
risk aversion (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2015). Although speculative,
this hypothesis of an arousal-driven loss aversion could explain
our findings that (i) manipulating emotional arousal influenced
loss aversion in the same direction regardless of valence and (ii)
this effect was specific to loss aversion, with risk aversion (esti-
mated separately) not altered by emotional manipulation.
However, due to time constraints in the scanner, a limitation
of our task design was that we were not able to include add-
itional trials necessary to estimate risk aversion together with
loss aversion in the same utility model. Typically this would be
done by adding choices between a sure gain and a gamble (fea-
turing a chance of a higher gain or zero); on such gain-only trials
only risk aversion (but not loss aversion) should contribute to
safe choices. Without these trials, our Prospect Theory-derived
model could not distinguish between risk and loss aversion.
Estimating risk aversion separately, using an approach that has
been used before (De Martino et al., 2010; Canessa et al., 2013),
and ensuring it did not contribute to the results by adding it as a
covariate in our analyses was the best alternative to overcome
this limitation.
Our fMRI results shed light on a potential mechanism under-
lying the emotional modulation of economic behavior, related
to amygdala-striatum functional connectivity. Consistent with
previous studies, we found that both amygdala and ventral stri-
atum tracked losses more strongly than gains (Tom et al., 2007;
De Martino et al., 2010; Canessa et al., 2013; Sokol-Hessner et al.,
2013); however, the modulation of these signals by emotional
cues was not associated with emotionally-driven changes in
loss aversion.
Instead, we found that the interaction between amygdala
and ventral striatum was the neural metric most related to the
behavioral effects we observed. Emotionally-induced changes
in functional connectivity between ventral striatum and amyg-
dala correlated negatively with trait anxiety and were associ-
ated with behavioral changes in loss aversion, with low-anxious
individuals showing increased loss aversion together with
increased amygdala-striatum functional connectivity in re-
sponse to emotional cues. We note a potential concern that
amygdala activations, according to a recent study, could be
driven by drainage from nearby vessels such as the basal vein of
Rosenthal (BVR: Boubela et al., 2015). However, in our fMRI data
we did not observe patterns consistent with BVR signals, even
at a very liberal threshold (data not shown). In particular, our
amygdala cluster responding to emotional relative to non-emo-
tional primes (MNI coordinates [30,1,24]) did not extend to
the posterior amygdala, and instead was located in the lateral
anterior amygdala on the opposite side to the BVR (MNI coord-
inates [14.6,7.7,15.5] according to Boubela et al., 2015) with
voxels adjacent to the BVR not activated. Therefore, we believe
that our amygdala activations are unlikely to be confounded by
a contribution from the BVR.
Amygdala-striatum connectivity is well established in both
animal and human fMRI work and has been suggested to play a
role in motivated behavior (Price, 2003; Zorrilla and Koob, 2013),
emotional memory (Ferreira et al., 2008; Paz and Pare, 2013),
reward-related processes (Everitt and Robbins, 1992; Camara
et al., 2008) and learning to avoid harmful negative outcomes
(Delgado et al., 2009). Our results provide a further insight into a
potential function of amygdala-striatum interactions, suggest-
ing that changes in functional connectivity between these two
regions, as opposed to responses in each region per se, may
drive the tendency toward more conservative decisions under
emotionally arousing conditions.
In summary, we show that incidental emotional cues can
modulate loss averse behavior and associated neural responses,
shedding light on a potential mechanistic account of emotional
influences on economic decisions (Phelps et al., 2014). We
speculate that the amygdala may integrate emotional informa-
tion about external cues together with value information from
the ventral striatum, to produce a decision signal. Individual
differences in amygdala-striatal coupling are related to trait
anxiety, possibly reflecting improved functional integration be-
tween these regions in low-anxious individuals and greater
flexibility to adapt decision-making in emotionally volatile
environments.
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